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COMMENTS
CONGRESS ANSWERS THE SUPREME COURT:
IS SABBITINO STILL LAW?
* . . [T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government
, * . even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law.' (Emphasis added.)
So spoke the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.2 The Court thus refused to question
the validity of expropriations of the property of American citizens by the
Castro government. 3 This holding extends the American act of state doc-
trine to litigation involving alleged violations of international law and, if
allowed to stand, will impede the growth and development of international
law in the area of alien property rights and sanction, by judicial abdication,
the illegal acts of foreign nations.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine
to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles
of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right
is asserted by any party including a foreign state . . . based upon ...
a confiscation or other taking . . . by an act of that state in violation
of the principles of international law. . . . Provided, that this sub-
paragraph shall not be applicable ... in any case with respect to which
the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is
required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in
that case with the court .... 4
1. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
2. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Petitioner's claim in this action, brought originally in
the federal district court of New York, was based onl a decree of the Cuban Govern-
ment expropriating certain property, the right to the proceeds of which were in con-
troversy. For a detailed study of the facts and lower court decisions in Sabbatino, see
Lillich, Ay Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square: The Second Circuit and Sabbatino,
8 VILL. L. Rev. 155 (1962).
3. For a discussion of the doctrine as applied specifically to expropriations of
the Castro Government, see Comment, 75 HARV. L. Rev. 1607 (1962). Another very
important holding of the Supreme Court in this case is that the act of state doctrine
is a principle of federal common law binding on federal and state courts alike. This
decision of the Court, extending the concept of federal common law, will not be
treated in this comment. For an analysis of this aspect of the Sabbatino decision, see
Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 806 (1964) ; Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional
Approach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325 (1964).
4. H.R. RN. No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1964).
(509)
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So answered the United States Congress in an Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, thus lifting from the courts a self-imposed
restraint. It is the purpose of this comment to trace briefly the develop-
ment of the American act of state doctrine 5 and to analyze the Congressional
change with regard to this doctrine.
I.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The landmark case defining the doctrine is Underhill v. Hernandez,"
decided by the Supreme Court in 1897, in which Chief Justice Fullen
stated :
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own
territory. 7
The Court reasoned that inquiry by one state into the acts of another
violated state sovereignty and was therefore not within the powers of the
court. The holding in the Hernandez case was applied in 1918 in Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co.,8 a case involving a dispute over the title to con-
signments of hide. The claim of title by the defendant was based upon a
confiscation by the Mexican government. The Supreme Court refused to
question the validity of the acts of the Mexican government because of a
strong reluctance to risk endangering our foreign relations with the
Mexican government.
In Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,9 also decided in 1918, a suit in
equity was brought to settle the title to lead bullion, one of the claimant's
titles having been derived from a confiscation by the Mexican government.
The Court again refused to question the validity of the confiscations. Re-
ferring to the doctrine as defined in Hernandez the Court said:
This last rule, however, does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction
once acquired over a case. It requires only that when it is made to
appear that the foreign government has acted in a way on the subject-
matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of the
result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a
rule for their decision. To accept a ruling authority and to decide
accordingly is not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is
an exercise of it. 10
5. For a comparison of the British act of state doctrine with the American doc-
trine, see Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959).
6. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The case involved an action by a United States citizen
against an official of the revolutionary government of Venezuela for detention within
that country.
7. Id. at 252.
8. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
9. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
10. Id. at 309.
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It should be observed that these three cases, on which the Supreme
Court and other lower federal courts have relied for almost fifty years, were
decided in the early 1900's when the idea of international law as a mean-
ingful force in the world was an absurdity and did not involve alleged vio-
lations of international law." The alleged illegality of the acts was based
upon national law, and the Court merely refused to measure the acts of a
foreign state against the laws of that state.12 Also, these cases did not
involve a question of jurisdiction, but of decision. The Court, by preclud-
ing itself from questioning the validity of the acts, assumed their validity
and thus according to the act of State doctrine the merits of each case were
decided as if the act were valid.' 3 Applying the doctrine as developed in
Hernandez, Oetjen, and Ricaud, the Supreme Court said in later cases that
"so long as the act is the act of the foreign sovereign, it matters not how
grossly the sovereign has transgressed its own laws,"'1 4 and "a foreign
sovereign power must, in our courts, be assumed to be acting lawfully."' 5
This was the status of the doctrine 6 until Sabbitino when the Court,
faced with an alleged violation of international law, saw fit to extend the
doctrine to that situation although not bound by precedent to do so.
II.
THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
There are three possible bases for the act of state doctrine: state
sovereignty, conflicts of laws, and judicial self-restraint because of a political
question.17
State sovereignty' 8 has traditionally meant that one independent coun-
try is supreme over its own territory and people and not subject to the laws
of any other country. The sovereign state is law unto itself and therefore
no other state can challenge the validity of its acts. This theory is a valid
11. Mention was made in Oetien of violations of the Hague Convention. This
Convention, however, dealt only with international warfare and was not applicable to
acts of a state during a civil war. Therefore, the Court did not consider the Conven-
tion applicable to the acts of the Mexican Government.
12. The 1960 Restatement clearly indicates that the doctrine does not apply to
alleged violations of international law. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 28d(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960). In the 1962 Draft the institute takes no position with
regard to the question of applicability of the doctrine to alleged violations of inter-
national law. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS § 43, caveat (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). For a discussion of, and disagreement with, the RestatementAview see
Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U. PITT. L. REv. 881
(1962).
13. Zander, supra note.5, n.30.
14. Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1940).
15. Eastern State Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279,
281 (1936).
16. The so-called "Bernstein Exception" will be considered later in this comment.
17. It is also suggested that the doctrine is itself a principle of international law.
However, as the Court said in Sabbatino, "no international arbitral or judicial decision
discovered suggests that international law prescribes recognition of sovereign acts of
foreign governments .. " 376 U.S. 398, 421-22 (1964).
18. For an analysis of state sovereignty see BRIURLY, THE LAW oF NATIONS ch. 1
(5th ed. 1955).
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basis for the act of state doctrine as applied to acts alleged to be in conflict
either with the domestic law of the acting state or with the public policy
of the forum. Certainly, in the reality of the state system, 9 one nation
could not be expected to accept the interpretation of its own laws by another
country or to accept an adjudication of its acts according to the laws of
another state. However, state sovereignty is not synonymous with law-
lessness, and in modern times, when sovereign states are politically and
economically interrelated, there is a growing recognition of the need for
a workable system of international law to direct the dealings between
sovereign states and their citizens. If a state can disregard international law
and have this lawlessness validated by other countries, international law
will become meaningless. The growth of international law is dependent
upon the recognition given to it by all nations as a binding force by applying
it in their courts. 20
The second theoretical basis of the doctrine is that of a conflicts of laws
approach. As such, it provides a solution to the question of what law will
be applied to test the validity of an act of a foreign state in the domestic
forum. However, as was previously indicated, this doctrine does not involve
a choice of law by the court; it is a determination by the court that a certain
act is valid and will be enforced as valid without inquiry.
Finally, the doctrine is considered one of self-imposed judicial restraint
out of deference to the political branches of the government, particularly
the executive department which has been entrusted with primary responsi-
bility for the conduct of our foreign affairs. 2 1 The judiciary has felt that
inquiry by it into the acts of foreign states presents the possibility of em-
barrassment to the executive department by a decision contrary to its
policies 22 or by interference with the executive department's efforts at
lump sum settlements at the diplomatic level.23 This then is a self-imposed
restraint because it touches a political question. "Questions touching the
external relations of the United States are 'political' in nature and therefore
not subject to judicial review. '24
As long as the acts of a foreign state did not violate international law
the "political question" doctrine, as a basis for judicial deference to its
co-ordinate branches of government, may have been a valid justification for
the act of state doctrine. However, it is questionable whether an alleged
violation of international law should be considered political. Since the
decision of Baker v. Carr,25 it is obvious that what is considered a political
19. For an analysis of the state system see BRIERLY, THm LAW ov NATIONS ch. 1
(5th ed. 1955).
20. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (dissenting
opinion). See generally Franck, International Law: Through National or Inter-
national Courtsf, 8 VILL. L. Riv. 139 (1962).
21. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
22. For a full discussion of the domestic reasons behind the doctrine see Snyder,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: The Supreme Court Speaks, 16 SYRACUSE L.
Rgv. 15 (1964).
23. Ibid.
24. Note, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1278, 1283 (1962).
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
[VOL. 10
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question in one decade does not always remain so. 26 Thus when interna-
tional law is available to be applied to an act of a foreign state, it may be
outmoded to hold this to be a political question. Political and legal ques-
tions should not be made indistinguishable. The Constitution has given the
Executive the power to recognize countries and this presents a political
question ;27 however, this power is not automatically accompanied by a
political validation of acts of the recognized country, 28 for that is a legal
question to be decided by the courts.
Of the three underlying justifications for the act of state doctrine, the
political question doctrine is the most vital to the reasoning of the Supreme
Court, primarily because of a fear of embarrassing the executive department
by contradicting executive policy.2 9 The courts do not want to risk conflict
with such executive policy. Therefore, it would seem that if the policy of
the executive department were that adjudication would not interfere with
executive decisions, the reason for judicial restraint would be lacking. This
proposition was in fact recognized by the Court in the so-called "Bernstein
Exception." In Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, Societe Anonyme, 30
the Circuit Court sought direction from the Executive as to whether or not
it should apply the act of state doctrine. Since he said nothing the court
applied the doctrine. However, in a subsequent case on the same facts,31
the State Department released a statement condemning acts of Nazi officials
and stating that the policy of the Executive "is to relieve American courts
from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the acts of Nazi officials."'32 The circuit court, therefore, acting
under the Executive expression of policy, disregarded the act of state doc-
trine and proceeded to an adjudication on the merits.
The "Bernstein Exception" was applied by the Circuit Court in Sab-
batino. 3 In that decision Judge Waterman found that communiques from
the State Department expressing our government's displeasure with the
acts of the Cuban government warranted invoking the "Bernstein Excep-
tion." The Supreme Court, however, rejected this proposition on the
grounds that the communiques were not sufficient evidence of State De-
partment desire to lift the restriction on judicial inquiry. The "Bernstein
Exception" was deemed not applicable in Sabbitino, the Court reserving
opinion on the exception for a proper case. Thus the act of state doctrine
after Sabbitino precluded the courts of the United States from adjudicating
26. Metzger, Act of State Doctrine Refined: The Sabbatino Case, in THE
SUPREME COURT REvIEw 223 (1964).
27. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 138 (1938).
28. Supra note 24, at 1285.
29. Contrary to the beliefs of American courts Sir Wilfred Green commented in
Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha of Kobe v. Bantham Steamship Co., [1939] 2 K.B.
544, 552 (C.A.) : "I do not myself find the fear of the embarrassment of the Executive
a very attractive basis upon which to build a rule of English Law."
30. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir. 1947).
31. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
32. Id. at 376.
33. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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the merits of an act of another state performed within its territory affecting
the property of foreigners even if the act is an alleged violation of inter-
national law unless the Executive makes known unequivocally that such
an adjudication would not embarrass the Executive Branch of the govern-
ment. The presumption is that an adjudication will embarrass the Execu-
tive unless he notifies the Judiciary to the contrary. As was stated earlier,
Congress has reacted to this position by the passage of an amendment which
suspends the application of the act of state doctrine unless the Executive
notifies the Judiciary that such an adjudication would be detrimental to
our foreign policy. The presumption is, therefore, reversed and the burden
is placed upon the Executive to object to the adjudication on the merits.
The amendment thus adopts a "Reverse-Bernstein Policy."8 4
III.
THE STATUTORY CHANGE: ITS PURPOSE
The statutory provision applies to the American act of state doctrine
as applied to expropriations of property owned by foreigners within the
expropriating country. The statute relieves the courts of this restraint
when these expropriations are an alleged violation of international law and
when the President makes no suggestion that the doctrine should be ap-
plied. In application, the statutory change will accomplish two goals: first,
it will provide a remedy at law for the victims of illegal expropriations, and
secondly, it will remove an obstacle to the development of international law
in this area.
Under the pre-statute doctrine the injured property owner, having
been precluded from an adjudication of his cause of action according to
principles of international law, could look for a remedy either through the
enforcement of bilateral treaties35 or through political negotiations leading
to lump sum settlements.86 The interests of the individual are subordinated
to political considerations and these remedies have, therefore, proved
inadequate.
This situation serves to defeat the efforts being made by the United
States government3 7 in encouraging private investment abroad, particu-
larly in the underdeveloped nations where expropriations are highly prob-
able because of political instability. Developing countries and capital coun-
34. The adoption of this "Reverse Bernstein" approach was recommended in 1959
,by the Committee on International Law of the New York Bar Association. 14 THE
RECORD OF THE AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY or NEw YORK 228 (1959).
35. Out of the 114 members of the United Nations 19 have bilateral treaties with
the United States which provide just compensation for confiscations of the property
of American corporations. Metzger, supra note 26, at 235.
36. Id. at 236. Also see Lillich, supra note 2, at 168.
37. For a statement on the needs and desires of private investors for protection
of their investments in foreign countries in an effort to cooperate with the United
States Government in its foreign assistance program, see Statement by Henry J. Clay,
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 481 (1964).
[VOL. 10
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tries need foreign investment; however, the investors also require some
guarantee of protection for their property rights.8 If private investors can-
not look to independent judicial decisions respecting their rights under in-
ternational law but must, "even when there is a flagrant violation of inter-
national law,"8 9 look to the "tortious, unpredictable, sensitive, and some-
times amateurist diplomatic channels of the executive" 40 they will not invest.
Prior to this amendment, the party seeking redress under international
law sustained the burden of seeking an executive expression of policy in
favor of lifting the act of state doctrine. Under the amendment, he no
longer has this burden.
The act of state doctrine as extended by Sabbitino is a serious impedi-
ment to the growth and development of international law in the area of
alien property rights. International law will develop by continued applica-
tion in national courts. 41 It has been recognized in this country that the
Law of Nations is part of our law and that the courts of the United States
are charged with the obligation of enforcing international, as well as
national, law.42 Thus during the debates from which our Constitution
emerged the "convention was in substantial agreement that there must be
a national judiciary and that it must have, at least in the last resort, a
paramount authority with respect to the Law of Nations .... ",48
The application of international law by one national court will neces-
sarily reflect the values and policies of that nation.44 This is precisely why
sovereign states are reluctant to accept adjudication of their rights by the
courts of another state. Appeal is available to countries or individuals whose
causes are espoused by their countries to the International Court of Jus-
tice.45 But, unless parties are first allowed recourse in national courts, they
cannot reach the International Court of Justice. This court will apply in-
ternational law as it has been developed by national courts ;46 therefore,
38. Snyder, supra note 22.
39. Id. at 37.
40. Ibid.
41. Franck, supra note 20. One of the principal objections to the lifting of the
act of state doctrine in this area of expropriations is that different countries have
conflicting views on the importance of private property rights and consequently on
the legality of confiscations. It is feared that since there is not sufficient consensus,
national courts will merely be applying national policy rather than accepted general
principles. See Remarks by Wolfgang Friedmann, Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 103, Meeting of the Columbia Society of International Law, May 1964. However,
it is submitted that this is one effective way of having principles supplied that can,
by application and acceptance, be developed into international law. See generally,
FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
43. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 38 (1952).
44. Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the United States Rejects
A Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Restores the Act of State
Doctrine, 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 631 (1964). Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the
Rule of Law - A Reply, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 141 (1960).
45. Hyde, The Act of State Doctrine And the Rule of Law, 53 Ala. J. INT L
L. 635 (1959).
46. Franck, supra note 20.
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individual nations must be willing to adjudicate issues of international law
and allow appeal from its decision. This is the only way in which a nation
can succeed in having its interpretation of international law and justice
"aired" in an international forum. Only by applying international law can a
nation hope to have it developed. It is a matter of great importance today
to realize that subjection to international law, although a step back from
state sovereignty, is a step toward international accord and cooperation.
If the United States as a nation seeks a world of law and order in inter-
national dealings, it must allow itself to be committed to the development
of international law. Furthermore, if application of international law de-
pends upon a prior political authorization it undermines international law
and shows a lack of committment to it.4 7 By relieving the courts of the act
of state doctrine in the area of expropriations, Congress has indicated its
willingness to recognize and apply international law in this area and is
thus taking a step toward a national commitment to international law.
IV.
THE STATUTORY CHANGE: ITS VALIDITY
The Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act is not a complete com-
mitment to international law. It recognizes that in some situations the na-
tional interest of the United States in our foreign relations would be in-
jured by judicial inquiry into the legality of the acts of a foreign nation.
In such a situation the statute will not apply if the President "determines
that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular
case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to
this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court .... ,,41 On the
filing of such a suggestion by the President it is the intent of the legislature
that the act of state doctrine as defined by the Court would then apply.
Since the burden is on the President to call for the application of the doc-
trine, it is likely that he will say nothing except in cases "deemed to be
fraught with the most severe consequences diplomatically. '49
This amendment, introduced into the Senate by Senator Hickenlooper,
was debated in the Senate but not in the House of Representatives. At the
time of its adoption, the House managers stated: "The managers on the
part of the House regretted that there has not been an opportunity for
thorough study and full hearings on the subject." 5° The application of
the amendment was limited to cases in which proceedings are commenced
before January 1, 1966. "This limitation was approved with the understand-
ing that the Congressional Committees concerned will make a full review
and study of the matter during the next Congress and make a determina-
47. Lillich, supra note 2, at 167.
48. Supra note 4.
49. Metzger, supra note 26, at 243.
50. H.R. ReP. No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1964).
[VOL. 10
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tion on the need for permanent legislation."'" Thus, during the next year
much debate is expected as to the policy and validity of the amendment.
It is submitted that while the purposes and policies of the amendment are
laudatory, the amendment itself is constitutionally questionable.
The act of state doctrine is a self-imposed judicial rule of restraint.
It is a rule of decision and can only be lifted by the Court itself.
The judicial power of the United States is posited by the Constitution
in United States Courts52 and this power encompasses adjudication, which
is "the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment .... ,,53 When
the courts apply the act of state doctrine they are pronouncing a judgment
on the act of another state. The doctrine dictates a specific result: that
the act is valid. Only the court itself can decide when to apply this rule
of decision. The amendment, in effect, gives the President the power and
the duty to suggest to the courts that in certain cases they are to find acts
of foreign states valid. This power is beyond the power of Congress to
delegate to the President and beyond the power of the President to execute
if the suggestion is to be considered binding on the court. "... [0] ur courts
are obliged to determine controversies on their merits, in accordance with
the applicable law . . .,,-4 unless the court itself feels obliged to restrain
its inquiry because the issue in litigation is a political question, but "what
is or is not a political question is for the court to decide in each case. . .."55
In the area of executive suggestion of sovereign immunity the courts
have felt themselves bound to follow the executive suggestion;50 however,
sovereign immunity involves a duty on the court to decline jurisdiction in
a particular case and not to decide a particular way. A recent opinion of
the New York Supreme Court held that while it would consider itself
bound by an executive suggestion of immunity so that the "resultant effect
is an instantaneous end of further judicial proceedings" it would not accept
an executive suggestion presented in such a way as to "prescribe a method
for judicial resolution. . . ,,11 This decision could indicate that the courts
would not consider the Presidential suggestion filed pursuant to the amend-
ment to the Foreign Assistance Act binding. However, because of the
willingness of the Judiciary to defer to the Executive questions touching
foreign relations when the President files such a suggestion, the court will
undoubtedly honor it by considering the issue political and invoking the act
of state doctrine itself.
51. Ibid.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
53. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 (1963).
54. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 450-51 (1964) (dissent-
ing opinion).
55. FORKOSCH, CONSTITU'IONAL LAW 60 (1963).
56. A sovereign nation can claim immunity to a suit in our courts either by directly
asking the State Department for a suggestion of immunity, or by raising immunity as
a defense in which case the court will ask the State Department if it should be granted.
When the State Department allows immunity the courts decline jurisdiction. Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
57. Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, National Corp., 213 N.Y.S.2d 396, 402 (1961).
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